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Abstract 
Family systems therapists are uncomfortable using psychoanalytic terms. 
This reluctance restricts discussion of therapeutic process. How does one 
describe, for example, the therapist’s subjective experiences of the patient or 
family? Psychoanalysts call this countertransference yet there is no 
equivalent word commonly used in systemic practice. Therapists who avoid 
the word may also avoid the experience and thereby risk losing sight of 
fundamental clinical events. 
 
Writing history backwards 
“Where does all this stuff come from? How do we decide to say what we say 
when we work with families…?” asks Sigurd Reimers (2006, p. 230). His 
sources include no primary psychoanalytic ones at all. The earliest reference 
in his paper is to an observation by James Framo that “it is almost impossible 
not to get caught up in the drama of the family interaction” (Framo, 1965, p. 
197) and a candid look at the “cases that touch on a feeling of ‘madness’ in 
us” (Reimers, 2006, p. 237). Reimers is thoughtful and observant but there 
is something parochial about a paper on the process of therapy that ignores 
the greatest body of work on the subject. 
 
I did a small ‘study’ in a specialist psychotherapy bookshop. Looking at the 
references in a sample of systemic therapy books I found none before 1956, 
and rarely any to psychoanalytic texts after that.  “As in the Russian 
revolution existing authorities were simply obliterated, as if they had never 
been. Even psychology was removed and replaced with philosophy and 
engineering” (Kraemer, 2002, p. 199). Though there are many honourable 
exceptions2 the perception still prevails amongst systems therapists that 
psychoanalysts tell patients what they are thinking and that their 
interventions are focused primarily on past events; “The therapist’s narrative 
                                                
1 A shorter version of this paper appears as ‘Is there another word for it? Countertransference 
in family therapy’ in Flaskas & Pocock, 2009, published here with permission, © Karnac. 
 
2  The systems revolution is more evident in retrospect, but taking only a small selection of 
books and papers, more recent attempts at synthesis, belonging to what Lockyer (2007) 
describes as a ‘subjugated narrative’, are to be found in Skynner (1976), Stierlin  (1977), 
Martin  (1977), Holmes (1985), Byng-Hall (1986), Luepnitz (1988), Kraemer (1994), Flaskas 
& Perlesz (1996),  McFadyen (1997), Speed (1997), Dare (1998), Larner (2000), Kraemer 
(2002), Donovan (2003), Johnsen,  Sundet & Torsteinsen, (2004), Flaskas, Mason & Perlesz 
(2005) and Flaskas & Pocock (2009). 
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becomes the client’s reality” (Gergen & Kaye, 1992, p. 172). A psychoanalyst 
who is disturbed or uncertain in the presence of a patient is rarely described.  
On both sides of the therapy fence there have been brave efforts to make 
authentic, nonphysical human contact through conversation with clients, but 
there is little fertilisation between them, leaving each open to accusations of 
mystification and omnipotence. 
 
Systemic therapy is rightly regarded as a new paradigm in psychotherapy. In 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas Kuhn (1962) showed how 
changes in our understanding of the world are not continuous or cumulative, 
as scientists are inclined to believe. On the contrary, there is a communal 
conservatism in scholarship and it is only from time to time that a new 
paradigm can emerge. This is not simply a matter of finding new data. “The 
transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience 
that cannot be forced” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 151). Kuhn noted how textbooks 
“have to be rewritten in the aftermath of each scientific revolution” (p. 137). 
“The temptation to write history backwards is both omnipresent and 
perennial” (p. 138). The terminology of the old paradigm is discarded, 
because it has no equivalents in the new. Something of this kind seemed to 
occur in the family therapy revolution where systemic concepts had no 
antecedent translations. Yet the new paradigm did not supersede the old. 
Psychoanalysis continued, and developed its own systemic ideas 
independently. Family therapy barely registered in the psychoanalytical 
world. 
 
 
Countertransference 
Countertransference was first thought to be an obstacle to psychoanalysis. 
Sigmund Freud had said in 1910 “we have become aware of the ‘counter-
transference’, which arises in [the physician] as a result of the patient’s 
influence on his unconscious feelings...” (Freud, 1910, p. 144, 145). 
Countertransference later became more useful. Amnon Issacharoff explains 
why it had at first been so troublesome: “It is almost as if [Freud] shied 
away from public comments on the matter. After all, psychoanalysis was not 
part of the ‘establishment’ at that time. It was still sensitive and highly 
vulnerable to its numerous detractors” (Issacharoff, 1979, p. 28). This 
vulnerability is the risk of exposing the private and personal feelings that 
analysts have about their patients. Yet, these are precisely what they learn 
to notice and take seriously, and from which new understanding arises. 
 
The Second World War changed psychotherapy. The damage done by loss, 
death and migration shifted the focus of dynamic psychology from individuals 
towards relationships.  “Psychology and psychopathology have focussed 
attention on the individual often to the exclusion of the social field of which 
he is a part” (Bion & Rickman, 1943, p. 681).  At the same time, 
sophisticated electronic engineering in guided missiles, and in other 
equipment using self-correcting feedback, contributed to the creation of 
cybernetics. Using systems theory, some psychologists and psychiatrists 
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discarded the prevailing paradigm of individual drives and devised new 
models of family interaction: “the conceptual shift from energy to 
information” (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967, p. 29). Meanwhile 
psychoanalysts, privileging the need for relationship over other drives, began 
to see countertransference as a source of information, communicated not in 
words but by the transfer of states of mind or feeling from one to another. 
Their innovations were evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Paula 
Heimann wrote: “In my view Freud's demand that the analyst must 
'recognize and master' his counter-transference does not lead to the 
conclusion that the counter-transference is a disturbing factor and that the 
analyst should become unfeeling and detached, but that he must use his 
emotional response as a key to the patient's unconscious” (Heimann, 1950, 
p. 83). Margaret Little grasped its elusiveness: “...to try to observe and 
interpret something unconscious in oneself is rather like trying to see the 
back of one’s own head - it is a lot easier to see the back of someone else’s” 
(Little, 1951, p. 33). Countertransference, she said, “is a special kind of 
identification of the analyst with the patient” (Little, 1951, p. 33). 
Psychoanalysts became less censorious of their own mental states. Using 
different terms, these pioneers were describing patient and analyst as a 
system3.  
 
One of the few psychoanalysts to acknowledge systems theory was Harold 
Searles (b. 1918). For many years he worked analytically with schizophrenic 
patients. He was impressed by the double bind theory and contributed a 
chapter in an early collection of papers on family therapy (Searles, 1965). 
His work is noted with approval in the classic text of Milan systemic therapy, 
Paradox and Counterparadox (Selvini-Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 
1978, p. 175). Searles’ candour in writing about his own states of mind at 
work is startling: 
 
“In my several-years-long work with a woman who showed a 
borderline personality organisation at the outset, I found that 
she recurrently held over my head, mockingly, year after year, 
the threat that she would become frankly and chronically 
schizophrenic. ... In many of the sessions during those years, I 
felt a strong impulse to tell her ironically that I had felt for 
years, and still did, that she could become chronically 
schizophrenic if she would just try a little harder. Essentially I 
was wanting at such times somehow to convey to her that this 
was a choice she had. ... In order for the analyst to help the 
patient to become able to choose, the former must be able not 
only to experience, indeed, a passionately tenacious devotion to 
helping the latter to become free from psychosis, but also to be 
                                                
3  “There is no such thing as a baby”. This famous statement, never published in these precise 
words, was first uttered by Donald Winnicott at the British Psychoanalytical Society in 1940. 
He was perhaps the first to note the essentially systemic nature of the baby and mother 
couple.  
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able to tolerate, to clearly envision, the alternative “choice” - 
namely that of psychosis for the remainder of the patient’s life” 
(Searles, 1986, p. 217). 
 
“[In] my work with patients who have been involved in 
chronically troubled marital situations wherein there is a 
chronic, suspense-laden threat of divorce hanging over the 
marriage ... it has appeared to me no coincidence that, 
concurrent with especially stressful phases of the analytic work, 
my own marriage has felt uncharacteristically in jeopardy” 
(Searles, 1986, p. 222). 
 
Searles shows how he is disturbed by his patients. He writes about feelings of 
romantic love, of intense amusement and, most powerfully, of alterations in 
his sense of identity, much more profound than mere changes in feeling. 
Psychoanalytic therapists are trained to attend to their most private 
fantasies. They learn this in their own analysis and in one-to-one supervision, 
where candid reflection on their mental and bodily states when with a patient 
is encouraged. Family therapy is less intimate, and fleeting subjective 
experiences can easily slip through the net. Yet these are often the events 
that make a difference in therapy. This is related to the question of training 
analysis. The requirement to have one’s own therapy is an essential condition 
for any psychoanalytic training, but not for systems therapy4. Many of the 
first and second generation family therapists had a psychodynamic training, 
including personal therapy, before they became family therapists. Though 
there are individual exceptions this is no longer the case. Lying on a couch 
with an analyst behind you makes you more familiar with inner states, 
including some that are not spoken of. The increasing absence of this 
tradition among systemic practitioners has fundamentally altered the craft, 
training and scholarship of family therapy.  
 
Where do you get your therapeutic ideas from?  Gregory Bateson said "The 
probe we stick into human material always has another end which sticks into 
us" (Haley, 1972, p. 26).  
 
Interviewing a 16 year old boy who had taken a suicidal overdose the 
previous day, together with his mother, I ask him a question and there is a 
long pause before he answers. He speaks deliberately and intelligently so I 
hang on his every word, as I sense does his mother. I wait, and feel 
tormented by this young man, who looks quite distressed but he also flashes 
an enigmatic smile at me from time to time. I said that he seemed a tortured 
person but that he also tortures others. Mother nods. 
 
                                                
4 The family therapy training at Bristol University requires trainees to attend three therapeutic 
consultations with their families, friends or colleagues (Woodcock & Rivett, 2007). 
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The sense of torment I experienced while waiting for words led me to make 
this comment. Moments like this happen every day in therapy. 
Psychoanalysts would regard this vignette as entirely unremarkable. For the 
rest of us “Where does this stuff come from?” is a question we still have to 
answer5. The client+therapist system includes bodies as well as minds. One 
source of data, not so available to analysts, is visual. In its purest form, 
psychoanalysis does not involve face-to-face communication during the 
session. Family therapy is mobile and active, with elements of spectacle. 
While listening and talking we are also looking, sometimes only subliminally 
noticing what we see. The family therapist Carl Whitaker (1912-1995) though 
quite theatrical and mischievous, was unusual in that he never abandoned 
his psychoanalytical roots. He would speak freely of his own reactions: “The 
way you glared at me just then gave me a prickly feeling in the back of my 
neck” (Whitaker & Keith, 1982, p. 343). In the 1970s I witnessed the 
psychoanalyst and psychiatrist Henri Rey in open clinical presentations at the 
Maudsley Hospital. He was interviewing a man with a very strange face. 
Others had spoken with him about everything except his face. Rey simply 
asked “What do you see when you look in the mirror?”  
 
Looking at faces is what mothers and babies do, the prototype of all intimate 
human contact. Colwyn Trevarthen compares these interchanges to theatre, 
demonstrating the “neonates' extraordinary capacities for reactive and 
evocative imitation” (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001, p. 3). Therapy with families 
exploits these qualities yet prevailing theory in systemic therapy does not 
refer to them. For example, the thesis of Harlene Anderson and Harry 
Goolishian’s iconic paper ‘Human Systems as Linguistic Systems’ is that 
“Therapy is a linguistic event” (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, p. 371). They 
wanted to forge a new paradigm by taking social science out of therapy. 
Citing the philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty, they show 
how conversation creates, rather than discovers, meaning. “Language does 
not mirror nature; language creates the nature we know” (p. 377). “By 
‘being in language’ we refer to the process of the social creation of the 
intersubjective realities that we temporarily share with each other” (p. 376). 
But they neglect the fact that language as it is learned in infancy is not 
simply social. It is aesthetic, a distillation of the communications that begin 
as sensuous, musical and dramatic qualities, contact with skin, solids, liquids 
and gases, and the apprehension of smells, noises, facial expressions and 
movements. Anderson and Goolishian disembodied the process to produce an 
omni-competent philosopher-therapist: “a master conversational artist, an 
architect of dialogue” (p. 383). The discredited psychoanalytic 
psychotherapist who knows best is replaced by one with acrobatic mental 
skills. “The therapist entertains multiple and contradictory ideas 
simultaneously” (p. 381). “It is in our questions that we display the skill of 
‘worldmaking’”(p. 382). “The therapist maintains a dialogical conversation 
                                                
5 Reimers (2006) presents an honest and subtle view of family therapists’ habitual modes of 
working and is clearly aware of the processes I am describing here, yet he does not grasp the 
countertransference nettle.  
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with himself or herself” (p. 382). They ask this paper’s key question “How 
does a therapist choose what to respond to and in what way?” (p. 381) and 
in answer acknowledge the irreducible fact of a personal viewpoint in every 
therapist:  
 
“As therapists, we all have opinions about people and about how 
all of us should or should not conduct our lives. … We cannot be 
blank screens. We think of these prejudgements as 
opportunities. That is, they are the energy to spark curiosity and 
the drive to explore other ideas. … In this process the therapist 
changes. …the only person the therapist changes in the therapy 
consultation is himself or herself” (p. 384).  
 
These words had a powerful impact on family systemic theory. Aiming for a 
shift in the therapist rather than the patient is indeed a radical idea6. Yet 
analysts had already, for decades, been struggling to restrain the urge to 
change patients: “..the capacity to forget, the ability to eschew desire and 
understanding, must be regarded as an essential discipline for the psycho-
analyst” (Bion, 1970, p. 51). As early as 1929, C. G. Jung wrote “…the doctor 
must change himself if he is to become capable of changing his patient ...” 
(Jung, 1954, p. 73) and described this transformation as traumatic: 
 
“ ... a good half of every treatment that probes at all deeply 
consists in the doctor's examining himself, for only what he can 
put right in himself can he hope to put right in the patient. It is 
no loss, either, if he feels that the patient is hitting him, or even 
scoring off him: it is his own hurt that gives the measure of his 
power to heal. This, and nothing else, is the meaning of the 
Greek myth of the wounded physician7” (Jung, 1954, p. 116).  
 
Although Anderson and Goolishian emphasise the risks that the dialogic 
therapist must take, what is missing from their account is how much anxiety 
is generated trying to keep an open mind under therapeutic pressure. They 
are describing ‘cool reflection’ (Lockyer, 2007, p. 41) rather than sweaty 
personal engagement.  Resistance to change is a fact of life, not altered by 
philosophy. In most social encounters we are negotiating with others, often 
                                                
6 Change in the therapist that precedes change in the client was also mentioned in passing by 
Luigi Boscolo and colleagues just a year earlier:  “While [positive connotation]  is often taken 
to be similar to the strategy of positive reframing ... actually it is much closer to a 
restructuring of the therapist's consciousness" (Boscolo, Cecchin, Hoffman, & Penn, 1987, p. 
7). An even briefer - perhaps the first  –  note of this process in systemic work appears in a 
bold paper on positive connotation by O’Brian  and Bruggen (1985): “Then the mental state 
did change” (p. 9). 
 
7 A rather uncanny parallel to this view comes from solution-focussed therapy. Steve de 
Shazer, no friend of analysis, demonstrates a similar exchange of anxieties in a simple 
diagram (de Shazer, 1982, p. 50). Like a shaman the therapist temporarily takes over the 
patient’s troubles. 
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covertly trying to change them rather than ourselves. This is precisely why 
there is such sustained effort on the part of systemic therapists to avoid 
doing so. In order not to impinge too much on their clients many have had to 
control, even censor, themselves quite carefully. In his work with a patient 
who had been sexually abused John Burnham courageously writes “my desire 
to be respectful had led me to be reluctant to take any risks in the 
relationship…” (Burnham, 2005, p. 17). Jim Wilson sometimes presses 
colleagues in systemic therapy workshops to tell of an episode that ‘worked’ 
but which they had “kept to themselves because it would be greeted by 
colleagues’ raised eyebrows as an unusual thing to do” (Wilson, 2007, p. 
148). In earlier times it was not only analysts who recognised the negative 
countertransference. Though I can find no published reference to this, the 
Milan group were famous for the ‘orgy of linear thinking’ they would indulge 
in behind the screen before coming up with a positive connotation. Their 
leader Mara Selvini Palazzoli (1916-1999) could be a cruel mimic of the most 
irritating members of a family in session. 
 
It is neither possible nor desirable to abandon all therapeutic prejudices, but 
it is necessary to keep monitoring and questioning them. “Injunctions to take 
up a position of ‘not-knowing’ are designed to move our cherished notions 
aside to make room for the patient’s, not to empty our minds entirely” 
(Kraemer, 2006, p. 243). It is significant that, from the very beginning, 
systemic therapists relied on philosophers for intellectual inspiration. None of 
these men were therapists and some such as Bertrand Russell (whose theory 
of logical types has a central role in the double-bind hypothesis) and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein found in philosophy a refuge from their own personal suffering. 
The fact that Wittgenstein, Bateson and Rorty (1986) all acknowledged, with 
inevitable reservations, the power and depth of Freud’s thinking is not noted 
in systemic texts. Speaking in 1940 a few months after Freud’s death 
Bateson said “in spite of all the muddled thinking that Freud started, 
psychoanalysis remains as the outstanding contribution, almost the only 
contribution to our understanding of the family – a monument to the 
importance and value of loose thinking” (Bateson, 1973, p. 58). “Here, 
finally, is a psychologist who has something to say” said Wittgenstein of The 
Interpretation of Dreams (Mancia, 2002, p. 169, 170). 
 
Theory and practice do not match here. In contrast to their published 
statements Anderson’s and Goolishian’s observed clinical work is intimate 
and embodied. “Instead of a therapist operating on the reality of a person or 
family from the outside, you had something closer to therapists putting 
themselves almost bodily into a family’s or person’s private world8” 
(Hoffman, 2002, p. 138). What were they feeling and thinking as they 
                                                
8 One of their most ardent followers, and an admired innovator in his own right, was the 
Norwegian psychiatrist Dr Tom Andersen. His practice, including many years of work with 
physiotherapists, was clearly ‘embodied’, yet his texts retain the fluidity of postmodern 
writing, in which judgements about others must always be suspect. “My concern is that a 
philosophy of ontology will be placed above a philosophy of ethics” (Andersen, 2001, p. 79). 
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worked like this? How, in their own words, do prejudgements spark curiosity? 
There is an opacity in their text as if, like the early psychoanalysts, they did 
not want to expose their personal reactions to public view.  
 
A theory of suffering  
As was their intention these authors steered systemic therapy away from any 
lingering preoccupations with pathology, either in client or therapist. A 
guiding star of the family systems revolution was ‘the end of blaming’, a 
worthy goal in that it helped us to support patients rather than humiliate 
them. Yet it is based on a logical error; that because psychoanalysts identify 
psychopathology in their patients they are therefore also blaming them for it. 
Searles (above) described the fine line that an analyst must tread between 
challenging and attacking. Even when the analyst has not crossed the line 
some patients experience challenges as blaming, but Searles’ conclusion is 
that analysis is only possible where the patient has a choice. One can pay 
attention – own up – to what one is doing, or not. To get away from making 
judgements about their clients systems therapists believed they had of 
necessity to get away from observing what was wrong with them, too. The 
urgent ambition to end blaming led to the abolition of pathology. In spite of 
the liberating methods of postmodern, narrative and related therapies (e.g. 
WHITE, 1995) the intellectual cost of this was a detachment of theory from 
practice, of mind from body.  
 
Many of the early family therapists were doctors9. The experience of careful 
clinical contact with the bodies of others - and seeing what diseases can do -  
stays with a practitioner for life, whatever path one then follows. “The ego is 
first and foremost a bodily ego” (Freud, 1923, p. 26). It may be significant 
that the greatest iconoclast, Jay Haley (1923-2007) was not medically 
trained10. His criticisms of psychoanalysis were relentless. Anderson and 
Goolishian’s work can be seen as a more recent manifestation of the 
movement to bury Dr Freud.  
 
The absence of a “theory of suffering” (Hoffman, 2002, p. 110) left the 
scholarship of family systems therapy too dependent on philosophy and 
mathematics rather than on clinical knowledge of people in mental pain or 
                                                
9 Apart from Bateson and Weakland, who were both anthropologists with no clinical 
background, most of the male pioneers were medically trained: Ackerman, Boszormenyi–
Nagy, Jackson, Minuchin, Fisch, Whitaker, Bowen, Wynne. Some were psychologists, Framo, 
Zuk, Watzlawick. Haley had university training in theatre arts, library science and 
communication. His clinical experience came from later collaboration with clinicians and social 
scientists. In contrast the majority of the leading women - Virginia Satir, Betty Carter, Lynne 
Hoffman, Marianne Walters, Peggy Papp and Olga Silverstein  - were social workers at the 
start of their therapeutic careers. In the generation that followed it is noteworthy that all the 
Milan associates were doctors and also had psychoanalytic training. 
 
10 Like Freud, Haley began his therapeutic career using hypnotism. Having rejected Freud he 
chose another doctor-hypnotist to be his mentor, the charismatic Milton Erickson, whose work 
and influence he celebrated in Uncommon Therapy: The Psychiatric Techniques of Milton H 
Erickson  M.D. (Haley, 1973). 
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terror, or in helpless states such as childbirth, infancy, and terminal illness. 
Having begun in revolution, family therapy remains in flight from its 
disavowed ancestors. “We tended to ascribe our effectiveness to the fact that 
we were using a new theory” (Beels, 2002, p. 69). Even its own pioneers, 
such as Salvador Minuchin (b. 1921) and Haley, who had developed the most 
powerful and dramatic methods of engagement with families, are routinely 
discredited. But at the beginning of this story is an emptiness where 
psychoanalysis should be. 
 
Working with a translator I am interviewing a teenage girl, T, and her father. 
Her mother is in their country of origin and has a serious mental illness. We 
discuss the mother’s condition and the girl, who speaks English fluently, says 
that neither she nor her father misses her, but she wished she had a 
different mother to help her now. T is taking dangerous risks with boys and is 
out of her father’s control. He wants me to give her psychiatric treatment to 
cure that. His voice becomes more shrill and intimidating. I am irritated and 
frustrated by this man, and say through the translator that I cannot see what 
the psychiatric problem is. T is insolent and provokes her father with 
tantalising grimaces and evasions. I am disturbed by her coquettishness with 
him. 
 
The meeting is not going well. The translator gets into lengthy discussions of 
which he gives me only brief summaries. Everyone seems to be talking at 
once. I am looking at T and say to her “Can you imagine having an argument 
with your father in English?” She laughs, with a hint of embarrassment or 
even mockery, but the father says, almost triumphantly while raising a fist, 
and before the question has been translated for him, “Yes!” 
 
Where did that come from? From two- to three-person systems 
I came across Gregory Bateson (1904-1980) and John Bowlby (1907-1990) 
at around the same time, as a psychiatric trainee in the 1970s. They were 
almost contemporaries and both saw human interaction in ethological and 
systemic terms, yet neither seems to have acknowledged the other in his 
published work11. While my therapeutic skill comes from training and 
personal experience - including analysis - these two polymaths provided me 
with a scientific basis for a theory of suffering. Bowlby was a psychoanalyst, 
but saw a limitation in the classical view of the child’s tie to the mother. 
Bringing ethology into the picture he showed that attachment is universal in 
mammals. An immature12 individual seeks to be looked after as much as it 
needs to be fed. ‘Looking after’, as these simple English words imply, means 
                                                
13 Bowlby knew of Bateson’s work, however. In 1958, while they were both working at the 
Tavistock Clinic, John Bowlby introduced Ronald Laing to the double bind theory of schizo-
phrenia. [Daniel Burston, ‘A brief biography of R D Laing’. 
http://www.decaelo.com/rdlaing/bio.htm] 
 
12 Attachment is also activated by fear, pain, darkness, tiredness, weakness, and any form of 
helplessness. It is lifelong. 
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following the infant’s state, trying to make sense of his or her experiences. 
The human baby, the most helpless of all newborn mammals, is programmed 
to engage with a caregiver immediately. The identification of attachment as a 
separate need was as revolutionary as the discovery of gravity. Once its 
universality was pointed out it was both blindingly simple to observe yet 
complex, even mysterious, in its workings. The unfolding of an attachment 
relationship is an intimate and formative process, all the more interesting 
because the couple cannot always understand one another. Small errors are 
inevitable and it is these breaks and the repairs that follow that promote the 
growth of mind and brain. “Reparation, its experience and extent, is the 
social interactive mechanism that affects the infant’s development” (Tronick, 
2007, p. 342).  
 
At around the same time as Bowlby had first formulated his theory (Bowlby, 
1958) Bateson and his colleagues were studying attachments gone badly 
wrong, in families with a schizophrenic member. They conceived the double 
bind, a graphic term to describe the torturous entanglement of parent 
(typically mother) and schizophrenic child (typically son). Systematic 
misunderstanding between the two is overwhelming, and there is no 
reparation. The theory explains how the subject of lifelong contradictions 
“would not know what kind of message a message is” (Bateson et al, 
1956/1973, p. 182)  
 
“Given this inability to judge accurately what a person really 
means and an excessive concern with what is really meant, an 
individual might defend himself [by assuming] that behind every 
statement there is a concealed meaning which is detrimental to 
his welfare. He would then be excessively concerned with hidden 
meanings and determined to demonstrate that he could not be 
deceived – as he has been all his life.” (Bateson et al, 
1956/1973, p. 182).  
 
In addition – which is what makes the bind double - the subject “.. cannot, 
without considerable help, discuss the messages of others. Without being 
able to do that, the human being is like any self-correcting system which has 
lost its governor; it spirals into never-ending, but always systematic, 
distortions” (p. 183). This description, while referring to concepts from 
engineering (and elsewhere in the paper to philosophy), does not evade the 
agony of the poor patient. The injunction on both partners not to notice what 
is going on is what makes it tragic. Not only are they bound in a torturous 
relationship, they are also gagged from commenting on it.  
 
In an introductory footnote to the double bind paper Haley and Weakland are 
credited with having noted “the formal analogies between hypnosis and 
schizophrenia” (Bateson et al, 1956/1973, p. 173). Without apparently 
knowing of this work, the British psychoanalyst Harold Stewart a few years 
later described the collusive relationship between hypnotist and patient. The 
trance is undermined, or even broken, if negative thoughts about the 
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hypnotist are entertained (Stewart, 1961). Likewise the ‘secondary 
injunction’ of the double bind “is communicated to the child by non verbal 
means” (Bateson et al, 1956/1973, p 178). It forbids the child to doubt that 
his threatening parent really loves him13.  
 
Bateson and Bowlby showed how from the very beginning the human being 
is intensely preoccupied by where he or she stands in relation to others. 
Infants have many ways of communicating but no ability to care for 
themselves. They are therefore always attentive to the state of the people 
who do this for them, on whom their lives depend. This works well enough 
when the adults can take the lead, but if caregiving is undermined by fear, 
pain, anxiety or depression the infant has to regulate himself. Tronick’s still 
face experiments show this most painfully (Tronick, 2007, p. 268). The 
mother, while sitting facing her baby, is asked to keep a still face for a few 
minutes. The child immediately becomes distressed, struggling to engage 
mother, looking away and withdrawing when he fails to do so. If this kind of 
mismatch is prolonged, for example when the mother is depressed, the 
infant has to adapt. He cannot give up entirely because he needs to be cared 
for. One option is to try and look after mother, a reversal of roles in which 
the child becomes parentified (Macfie, McElwain, Houts, & Cox, 2005). 
Searles had noted that “..innate among the human being’s emotional 
potentialities, present in the earliest months of postnatal life, is an essentially 
psychotherapeutic striving” (Searles, 1979, p. 459). Though not taboo, the 
infant’s efforts are not usually appreciated by either partner, in effect a futile 
and invisible exercise. 
 
The reinvention of the Oedipal triangle  
Initial enmeshment of caregiver and infant may obscure the presence of 
others in the family drama, but there is always a third party. Recent 
systematic studies have shown what child psychotherapists have frequently 
observed, how within a few weeks of birth infants also begin to monitor the 
relationships between the adults around them (Fivaz-Depeursinge & Favez, 
2006). Regulating ones place in three person systems is a basic skill, and 
lasts a lifetime.  
 
‘Two against one’ has an ancient pedigree, being a familiar feature of primate 
social systems (Harcourt & de Waal, 1992). As humans evolved from apes, 
gossip - two individuals together discussing the condition of a third -  brought 
language into the frame (Dunbar, 1996). By historical times the triangle had 
became the staple of tragedy, of passion, murder, and suicide: the rivalry of 
Cain and Abel, the incest of Oedipus, the jealousy of Othello. Freud saw 
Oedipus’ desire in the mind of every child, who “… notices that his father 
stands in his way with his mother” (Freud, 1920, p. 105). He has to learn 
that babies can’t make babies (Kraemer, 2005, p. 114). Overcoming this 
                                                
13 This is close to the much more recent notion of disorganised attachment (Solomon & 
George, 1999). Minuchin’s term for an entangled cross generational relationship, especially in 
psychososomatic families, was ‘enmeshment’. 
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disappointment will in time expand his consciousness so that he becomes 
capable of “being a participant in a relationship and observed by a third 
person as well as being an observer of a relationship between two people” 
(Britton, 1989, p. 86).  
 
“A third position then comes into existence from which object 
relationships can be observed ... This provides us with a 
capacity for seeing ourselves in interaction with others and … 
for reflecting on ourselves whilst being ourselves" (Britton, 
1989, p. 87). 
 
The three players are never quite comfortable, however. “Essentially, the 
task for the mother, father and infant involves tolerating the link between 
two people they desire and which excludes them. This situation cannot be 
harmonious” (Marks, 2002, p. 95). As in musical chairs someone is always 
being left out. In the most disturbed families the game is stalled with one 
parent repeatedly excluded but -  as the double bind explains -  no one must 
comment on this. We can then no longer see ourselves in interaction with 
others.  
 
The double bind was originally a feature of a two-person relationship but, 
within a few years, Haley had extended its remit beyond psychosis, and 
added a third person. His identification of the ‘perverse triangle’ (Haley, 
1967) was described by Hoffman as “Haley’s leap from a fascination with 
communication to a fascination with structures” (Hoffman, 1981, p. 112). 
This was a paradigm shift that brought the Oedipus complex into the heart of 
systems theory14. While consistently scornful of psychoanalysis, Haley 
described how the child has a special relationship with one parent, which 
excludes the other.  
 
“The term coalition means a process of joint action against a 
third person … the problem is most severe when the coalition 
across generations is denied or concealed … when this becomes 
a way of life the family organisation is in trouble” (Haley, 1976, 
p. 109).  
 
Though they worked in different ways both Haley and his colleague Minuchin 
(1974) framed the presenting problem in a young person as a challenge to 
the power arrangements between the parents. The child is out of control but 
the couple cannot act together to contain him, because one of them is in a 
covert coalition with the child15. Crediting Haley’s influence, the Milan 
associates fearlessly brought this out into the open by asking in therapy 
                                                
14 In an intricate psychoanalytic paper Aaltonen and Räkköläinen (1987) identify a double bind 
in the Oedipus complex. 
 
15 The failing couple can be mother and father or any other pair, such as mother and 
grandmother, mother and stepfather, a parent and an older sibling  or, in larger systems, a 
school and a parent, a manager and a clinician, and so on (Haley,1976,  p. 116/7). 
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sessions “where is the marriage in this family?”. Their technique of circular 
questioning (Selvini-Palazzoli et all, 1980) exposed family members’ constant 
monitoring of others’ relationships, which usually goes on beyond awareness.  
 
The systems revolution had reinvented the Oedipal triangle but in a form that 
was no longer recognisable. There is a common thread of cover up here. The 
injunction to turn a blind eye to a coalition between parent and child was first 
described by Sophocles. Jocasta (Stewart, 1961) and Oedipus (Steiner, 
1985) were not innocent victims of fate. They had knowledge of their own 
parts in the tragedy but concealed it from themselves, and from each other. 
The rewritten history of systems therapy brushed out our bond with 
psychoanalysis. 
 
In the clinical example above, there was no mother to intervene in a 
dangerous escalation between father and daughter.  I felt like a boxing 
referee who has to pull the contestants apart, to get them into a healthier 
relationship; something an effective mother - the one that T wished for - 
could have done. In retrospect I see how anxiety about the sexual tension 
between father and daughter prompted me to take mother’s place, to 
propose another form of intercourse for them that is not secret or perverse, 
but can instead be celebrated. 
 
Conclusion  
The absence of clinical theory has left systemic therapists reliant more on 
wisdom and intuition and less on reflection of their own mental and physical 
states. Without an explicit account of ones own viewpoint there is a risk of 
idealising or mystifying our sources, as Lynn Hoffman (Hoffman, 2002) tends 
to do, using poetic metaphors such as the ‘deep well’ to describe where her 
therapeutic ideas come from. “Inner movements” (Shotter & Katz, 2007, p. 
29) and similar descriptions refer to the effects on us of our patients and 
clients. These are less mysterious if seen as the necessary work of a 
therapist trying to make sense of what he experiences, according to his own 
ideas.  
 
Because systems therapy saw no use for transference it was thrown out, but 
countertransference - which is still needed - went with it. The successive 
flowering of systemic therapies made possible clinical interventions that could 
not have taken place in other models: medical, behavioural, cognitive or 
psychoanalytic. This was a revolution, after all. My purpose is not to reverse 
it, but to understand what we actually do and to contribute to a more honest 
history of psychotherapy. 
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